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Abstract 
Despite the importance of wage rigidity in macroeconomic models, no consensus has 
emerged in the empirical literature on the extent of wage rigidity. Previous attempts to 
measure wage rigidity have been hampered by small samples and measurement error. 
Moreover, results relating to earlier periods may not be relevant in the context of the large 
macroeconomic shocks that have hit many countries in recent years. In this paper we examine 
nominal wage flexibility in Ireland both in the build up to, and during the Great Recession, 
using tax return data that are free of reporting error and cover the entire population of 
workers. The Irish case is particularly interesting because it has been one of the countries 
most affected by the crisis. We find a substantial degree of downward wage flexibility in 
Ireland in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, we observe a significant change in wage 
dynamics since the crisis began; the proportion of workers receiving wage cuts more than 
trebled, rising from 17% in 2006 to 56% at the height of the crisis. Given the large number of 
workers receiving pay cuts it seems unlikely that wage rigidity played an important role in 
unemployment dynamics in Ireland over this period.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of whether wages are rigid or flexible is one that has been central to 
macroeconomics for many years.
1
 However, many attempts to establish the extent of wage 
rigidity empirically have been hampered by small samples or measurement error. Moreover, 
results relating to earlier periods may not be relevant in the context of the large 
macroeconomic shocks that have hit many countries in recent years. In this paper we examine 
nominal wage flexibility in Ireland both in the build up to, and during the Great Recession, 
using tax return data that are free of reporting errors and cover the entire population of 
workers. 
The Irish economy provides an interesting setting for examining the flexibility of 
wages. After a period of very rapid growth from 1994 to 2007, when the average annual GDP 
growth rate was over 7%, the economy collapsed and the average growth rate over 2008-
2011 was -1.75%. This is reflected in the unemployment rate, which was relatively stable at 
4%-5% for most of the early 2000s, rose to 12% in 2009 and continued to rise further to 
14.6% in 2011. Inflation averaged 2.5% in the period from 1994 to 2011 but was negative in 
2009 (-4.5%) and 2010 (-1%). Given these substantial changes in the macroeconomic 
environment, and the general flexibility of the Irish labour market (Andranik, 2008), it is 
useful to examine the extent to which wages responded during this period. In a recent address 
to the 2014 Annual Central Bank Symposium, ECB President Mario Draghi attributes the 
recent diverging performances of the Irish and Spanish labour markets in part to the fact that 
“ Ireland entered the crisis with a relatively flexible labour market …[In addition] in Ireland, 
downward wage adjustment began already in the fourth quarter of 2008 and proceeded more 
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 For a discussion of the role of wage flexibility in alternative economic models see Gali (2012). 
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quickly [than Spain].” These conclusions are based on measures of aggregate wage changes 
for all workers, public and private sector combined.  
In this paper we look at nominal wage changes over the pre-crisis and crisis periods 
using individual panel data. We find a significant degree of downward wage flexibility in the 
pre-crisis period, supporting the view that the Irish labour market is a flexible one. We also 
observe a significant response in wage change behaviour since the crisis began; the 
proportion of workers receiving earnings cuts more than trebled during the crisis. In addition, 
estimates of wage rigidity, which were already low before the crisis, fell further at the onset 
of the crisis, when unemployment was increasing dramatically. Given these findings, it seems 
unlikely that nominal wage rigidity played an important role in explaining Irish 
unemployment dynamics during the crisis.  
 The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous work 
relating to wage flexibility. Section 3 gives a brief overview of the Irish policy response to 
the crisis. Section 4 describes the datasets used in the analysis. Section 5 reports the main 
results of the paper, based on tax return data, while Section 6 reports some supplemental 
analyses carried out using the EU Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) data. 
Section 7 provides estimates of the degree of wage rigidity in Ireland. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There is a substantial body of research that uses microdata to examine the extent of wage 
flexibility. However, as of yet no general consensus has emerged. McLaughlin (1994) 
analysed Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data and concluded that wages in the US 
were flexible; 17% of household heads who did not change employers faced nominal wage 
cuts annually. However, these results have been challenged by a number of authors who 
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argue that the extent of wage cuts in these data may be exaggerated by measurement error. 
Altonji and Devereux (2000) using both firm level personnel files and household survey data 
conclude that nominal wage cuts are rare once one accounts for measurement error. More 
recently Barattieri et al. (2014), using Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
data and an alternative strategy to identify measurement error, reach a similar conclusion. 
For the UK, Smith (2000) uses the 1991-1996 British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to examine wage rigidity. Her initial results indicate that 9% of job stayers 
experienced a zero nominal wage change from year to year, and that 23% experienced 
nominal wage reductions. To examine the consequences of measurement error, she uses the 
fact that the BHPS records whether respondents consulted their payslips when answering the 
wage question. In contrast to the results of Altonji and Devereux (2000) and Barattieri et al. 
(2014), she finds that measurement error in household surveys leads to an understatement of 
the extent of wage flexibility. The proportion of workers reporting no wage change falls from 
9% to 6% when the sample is restricted to those who consult their payslip, a pattern she 
attributes to rounding error.  
Evidence of wage changes for other countries is more limited. Dickens et al. (2007) 
report the results of the International Wage Flexibility Project, which analyses individual 
earnings in 16 countries. They find that on average 8% of workers receive nominal wage 
freezes, and in many countries wage cuts are rare. Ireland is unusual in that there is a lower 
incidence of wage freezes, and almost as many wage cuts are reported as would be if the 
wage cut distribution were symmetric. They argue that the data used for their Irish analysis, 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), may explain the unusual Irish results as 
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it contains fewer observations and more reporting errors than the datasets available for other 
countries.
2
  
Recently researchers have begun to examine wage adjustment in the Great Recession. 
Blundell et al. (2014) examine payroll data from the National Employment Survey (NES) for 
the UK and find that the number of workers experiencing wage freezes increased from 
approximately 5% in 1990 to 12% in 2011. However, they find a significant degree of 
downward wage flexibility; throughout the 1990s and 2000s, almost 20% of stayers report a 
nominal wage cut. Elsby et al. (2014) also analyse UK NES data and similarly find that 
nominal wage cuts are frequent. 
For the US, Elsby et al. (2014) use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to analyse 
wage changes from 1979-2011. They report several key features of the wage adjustment 
process in the US. First, there is always a significant spike at zero in the wage change 
distribution – between 6% and 20% of workers report exactly the same nominal wage in both 
years. Secondly, there is always a non-trivial fraction of workers (between 10% and 20%) 
who report nominal wage reductions. Thirdly, while the zero spike increased during the Great 
Recession, the increase was not substantial. They consider the implications of these features 
of the wage change distribution and suggest that the high unemployment observed in recent 
years would have been nearly as high in a world with completely flexible wages.  
Much of the research on Ireland in recent years has used firm-level rather than individual-
level data to examine the extent of downward wage rigidity. Du Caju et al. (2013) analyse a 
2007/2008 survey of European firms and find that only 2% report having cut wages over the 
previous five years; the figure for Ireland was just 1%. Using the same data, Babecký et al. 
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 The ECHP has also been used by Knoppik and Beissinger (2009) to develop a more formal model of wage 
rigidity. 
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(2010) report that 10% of firms froze base wages, with a corresponding figure for Ireland of 
9%. Walsh (2012) uses the Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) to 
examine wage changes during the recession and finds that 23% of establishments report cuts 
in average hourly earnings between 2008 and 2009, rising to 31% between 2009 and 2010. 
 
3. Irish Policy Response to the Crisis 
As noted earlier, Ireland was one of the countries worst affected by the Great Recession, with 
output falling by over 10% in real terms between 2008 and 2010. The effects of the global 
recession felt elsewhere were compounded in Ireland by the bursting of a property bubble and 
the subsequent collapse of output and employment in construction-related sectors. Because 
bank lending was so highly concentrated in construction, Irish banks experienced huge losses 
and the government decided to guarantee all bank liabilities in 2008. However, continued 
falling tax revenue and exposure to bank liabilities resulted in the government deficit going 
from almost zero in 2008 to 13.9% in 2010 and a remarkable 30.8% in 2011, when banking 
losses crystallized. As a result, yields in Irish bonds reached unsustainable levels in 2010, and 
the government sought and accepted a rescue package from the EU, ECB and IMF. 
The crisis resulted in the government undertaking a severe programme of austerity 
measures, combining tax increases and expenditure cuts. As part of the expenditure cuts, the 
government set out to cut payroll costs in the public sector substantially by reducing staff and 
directly cutting pay. Pay rates in the public sector were initially reduced via a Pension Levy 
introduced in 2009 ranging from 5% to 10.5%. Further pay cuts of 5% to 10% were 
implemented in 2010.
3
 In addition, there were increases in hours worked, the reduction or 
elimination of overtime rates, and lower pay scales for new entrants into professions such as 
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 A third round of public sector pay cuts was implemented in 2013, but these cuts lie outside the period covered 
by our data. 
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teaching. However, it should be noted that automatic annual pay increases continued to be 
paid to some public sector workers until 2013, when they were delayed. The government also 
abandoned the national wage setting process that had been in place since 1987, in which 
unions and participating employers bargained at a national level over wage increases.
4
 
The immediate aim of these measures was to reduce the government deficit. A longer-
term aim was to effect an internal devaluation; as a member of the euro area, only cuts in 
labour and other costs could reduce real exchange rates. For example, there was an 
expectation that the public sector wage cuts would have a demonstration effect on the private 
sector, and so contribute to the desired internal devaluation. However, aggregate data indicate 
stability in the wages of private sector workers since the onset of the crisis (Barrett and 
McGuinness, 2012; Bergin et al. 2012). This would suggest that Ireland has been unable to 
achieve the necessary internal devaluation through private sector wage reductions, perhaps 
indicating a substantial degree of wage rigidity. However, as acknowledged by the authors, 
aggregate data suffer from a number of drawbacks. First it is difficult to control for 
compositional changes in the workforce that have taken place during the crisis; if workers 
who have lost their jobs differ from those who continue to be employed then basing average 
wages only on the population of workers will be misleading. Secondly even if the aggregate 
wage change is relatively small this may be hiding substantial differences in wage 
adjustments across individuals. By following the earnings of individuals over time we 
address both these issues. 
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 The national pay agreements were always rigidly adhered to by public sector and semi-state employers. 
However, for private sector employers, adherence was effectively voluntary and by the time of our sample 
period, the agreements appear not to have been widely applied. 
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4. Data 
Two datasets are used in the paper. Our main analysis is based on data taken from the Job 
Churn (JC) dataset, which is a longitudinal administrative dataset covering the years 2005-
2011 that has been compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). These data combine 
three elements. Data on annual income and weeks worked are provided by the tax authorities 
in respect of every worker who was an employee during that year. Information on workers’ 
age, sex and social welfare class are provided by the Department of Social Welfare. Finally, 
data on the sector in which each firm operates and the enterprise’s ownership structure come 
from the CSO’s Central Business Register. Anonymised worker and firm identifiers are 
included in the dataset to allow longitudinal analysis. 
There are several significant advantages to using the JC data to examine changes in 
earnings over time. Firstly, because they are administrative data, based on tax returns, they 
are largely free from measurement error; it is a criminal offence to misreport workers’ 
earnings in these returns. Secondly, the data comprise the entire population of employees in 
Ireland and so the number of observations is large enough to allow very detailed analysis of 
earnings changes; there are up to three million employment records in any year. Thirdly, 
since employers are obliged to file these returns for every worker, problems associated with 
non-response and attrition are absent from the data. Finally, the data cover the period from 
2005 to 2011, allowing us to compare earnings dynamics before and during the crisis.  
The earnings variable provided in the JC data also has significant advantages. 
Earnings are defined as annual ‘reckonable’ income for the calendar year;5 this is gross 
income from all sources including bonuses and taxable benefits-in-kind, after pension 
                                                          
5
 One complication that arises from the use of an annual earnings measure is that the number of pay days can 
vary for weekly paid workers because of the structure of the calendar. For instance workers who are paid weekly 
would have received 53 pay cheques in 2010 if paid on Fridays but only 52 in 2009 or 2011 – resulting in a 
recorded earnings rise of 1.9% between 2009 and 2010 and a cut of 1.9% between 2010 and 2011 for workers 
whose weekly earnings were unchanged. We take account of this in our analysis where possible. 
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contributions, which are not taxable, have been deducted. The fact that irregular earnings are 
included is important because firms can adjust labour costs through these components as well 
as basic pay; for evidence on the widespread use of adjustments to non-core pay in 2007-
2008, see Du Caju et al. (2012) and Dias et al. (2013). In addition, firms can react to labour 
market shocks by changing hours of work, so we believe that data on earnings are the most 
appropriate for capturing the flexibility firms have in adjusting costs. The fact that the income 
measure is net of pension contributions allows us to take into account the Public Sector 
Pension Levy, mentioned in Section 3 above. Since this levy reduces earnings and entails no 
compensating increase in pension entitlements, it has the same effect as a reduction in gross 
pay, but it does not register as such in household surveys that record gross earnings. 
While it may be of interest to decompose earnings changes into core pay, non-core 
pay and pension contributions, the JC data contain no information that would allow this 
decomposition. For this reason, we supplement our primary analysis by using the Irish 
component of the EU-SILC for the years 2004-2011. In Ireland, EU-SILC data is collected 
using a dedicated survey of about 5,000 households, who are interviewed annually.
 
 
In the EU-SILC data, we use two pay variables – annual income and hourly wages. In 
contrast to the JC data, annual income includes pension contributions but excludes overtime 
and bonus payments. Thus, comparing annual earnings in these two datasets allows us to 
consider the role of these components in earnings dynamics.
 
The hourly wage variable is 
calculated based on income received in the last pay cheque and hours worked. A comparison 
of the annual and hourly wage variables in the EU-SILC allows us to consider the role of 
hours worked in explaining earnings changes.  
All income variables in the EU-SILC were subject to careful cleaning by the CSO, 
using administrative and other sources. In addition, respondents were encouraged to check 
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their payslips and whether they did or not was recorded. For these reasons, reporting error is 
likely to be less important in the EU-SILC than in the ECHP used by Dickens et al. (2007) 
and Knoppik and Beissinger (2009). 
For both JC and EU-SILC datasets, we focus on job stayers, those who remain with 
the same employer in successive years.
6
 In the JC data, job stayers may have changed roles 
even if they did not change employer, whereas in the EU-SILC data, job stayers exclude 
those who have been promoted. In addition, for both datasets we restrict our samples to 
employees who had worked for the full year in each pair of years. In the JC data, we also 
exclude all workers who had multiple jobs, while in the EU-SILC data we restrict our sample 
to those who consulted pay slips in order to minimize measurement error. As noted earlier, 
there are no hours data available in the JC data and so for ease of comparison, we include 
both part-time and full-time workers in the EU-SILC sample.  
Because of the different wage-setting mechanisms that pertain in the public and 
private sectors, we supplement our overall analysis with separate examinations of these 
sectors. While there is no public sector identifier in the JC data, the enterprise’s NACE code 
and its ownership structure can be combined to give a good indication of which sector an 
individual works in. When defining public sector workers, we omit workers in commercial 
state enterprises to the extent possible. 
After imposing these restrictions, we have between 700,000 and 800,000 observations 
in the JC data, and between 300 and 800 in the EU-SILC data. 
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 Summary statistics on the proportion of workers in the JC data who are job stayers are given in Table A1 of the 
Appendix. 
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5. Main Results: Analysis Using Administrative Job Churn Data 
We begin our analysis by looking at the relationship between average earnings and 
unemployment. Figure 1 plots real average annual earnings in 2006 prices against the 
unemployment rate over our sample period. The correlation between real earnings and 
unemployment over this period is -0.8. Given the short data period, the results are merely 
suggestive but nevertheless offer support for the procyclicality of real wages in Ireland.  
To analyze wage dynamics in more detail, we exploit the longitudinal nature of the JC 
data and look at annual nominal earnings changes for individuals for each pair of years 
between 2005 and 2011. Following Ziliak et al. (2011), we calculate percentage earnings 
changes using the arc percent change method. The key advantage of this method is that it is 
symmetric in gains and losses.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the annual earnings changes from 2005/06 to 
2010/11. Column 2 shows the median percentage earnings change for each pair of years. The 
growth in earnings in the pre-crisis period is evident in the numbers reported for 2005-2008, 
with median annual growth rates of between 4.5% and 6.1%. The impact of the crisis is 
clearly observed in the later period, with negative median wage changes of about 1% in 
2008/09 and 2009/10. These wage changes are consistent with the relatively small changes in 
average earnings reported by Barrett and McGuinness (2012). 
However, as noted earlier, aggregate measures may hide important differences across 
individuals. Columns 3-5 report the percentage of workers receiving an earnings freeze, an 
earnings cut and an earnings rise; as is common in the literature, we classify a change of less 
than 0.1% as an earnings freeze. These data reveal substantial flexibility. Similar to Blundell 
et al. (2014) for the UK and Elsby et al. (2014) for the US and the UK, we find that a non-
trivial fraction of Irish workers report nominal earnings reductions in each year. In the pre-
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crisis period, the percentage of workers experiencing earnings cuts ranges from 17% to 23%. 
In contrast to the US and the UK, this proportion increased substantially during the crisis, 
reaching a high of 55% in 2009/10, compared to 23.6% in the UK and 37% in the US.  
Although these results illustrate significant wage reductions in response to the crisis, 
it is worth noting that the percentage experiencing earnings increases remains above 40% 
throughout the period. This compares to a figure of over 60% reported for the UK by 
Blundell et al. (2014). 
Turning to wage freezes, the percentage of workers whose earnings did not change 
from year to year was less than 3% in the pre-crisis period and rose to 6.8% in 2010/11. Elsby 
et al. (2014) report that the percentage of nominal wage freezes in the UK over the period 
2005-2011 ranges from 1.7% to 7.4%, findings that are similar to ours. However, for the US 
they find that the proportion of wage freezes is substantially larger, ranging from 17.6% to 
19.5% for hourly paid workers and from 9.4% to 14.9% for non-hourly paid workers. 
To look at these earnings changes in more detail, Figure 2 shows the histograms of 
annual nominal earnings changes in each of the years. We include two lines on each graph – a 
solid line at zero, indicating a nominal earnings freeze and a dashed line at the inflation rate 
for that year, corresponding to a real earnings freeze. In each year we observe a spike in the 
nominal earnings change distribution at zero, as discussed earlier. In addition to the spike at 
nominal zero, we also observe a spike near the inflation rate in the pre-crisis period. As we 
will see later in the paper, this spike applies only to public sector workers, and is likely to 
reflect national pay agreements, which targeted the expected inflation rate and were strictly 
adhered to in this sector until 2008.
7
 The shift to the left of the wage change distribution 
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 There are also notable spikes at roughly -2% and +2% in the later years; this reflects the distribution of pay 
days for weekly paid workers and the complication this causes for annual pay discussed in Footnote 5. 
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during the crisis is also evident from the graphs, as is the increase in mass to the left of the 
median in 2008/09 and 2009/10. 
Given the relatively small number of freezes in the Irish wage change distribution and 
the very large number of workers receiving earnings cuts during the recession, it seems 
unlikely that nominal wage rigidity played an important role in explaining Irish 
unemployment dynamics during the crisis.  
As well as the incidence of pay cuts and pay rises, it is also useful to examine the 
magnitude of these changes. These are reported in Table 2. Column 2 (3) shows the size of 
the median earnings cut (increase) for those receiving cuts (increases) over the period. 
Surprisingly, with the exception of 2010/11, the magnitude of pay cuts was relatively 
constant, while there was a slight decline in the magnitude of pay increases. 
A major focus of policy discussion during the crisis centred on the relative wage 
adjustments in the public and private sectors. Table 3 presents earnings changes separately 
for these two sectors. Looking at the pre-crisis years, we see that earnings dynamics were 
similar in the two; between 15% and 25% experienced earnings cuts
8
 and between 71% and 
85% experienced earnings increases. As discussed earlier, a key government response to the 
crisis involved the imposition of a series of direct pay cuts in the public sector. Table 3 shows 
that 59% of public sector workers experienced an earnings cut in the 2008/09 period, 
increasing to 81% in 2009/10.
9
 Furthermore the magnitude of the cuts was substantial; the 
median earnings change was a cut of 6% in 2009/10. Although there were no legislated pay 
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 The prevalence of earnings decreases in the pre-crisis period is somewhat surprising, particularly in the public 
sector, where announced pay changes were all positive. The JC data allows us to examine the frequency of 
earnings cuts by NACE sector for evidence of a pattern that might be explained by hours variability. In results 
not reported here, we see that even pre-crisis, earnings cuts were widespread in all areas of the public sector and 
did not seem to vary substantially by gender. The EU-SILC data includes variables that allow us to explore this 
issue further, so we postpone more detailed discussion of these explanations until later 
9
 Recall that annual increments continued to be paid to some public sector workers throughout our period. 
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cuts in 2010/11, 36% of public sector workers experienced a reduction in annual earnings in 
that year.  
Table 3 also reveals a significant response to the crisis for private sector workers. The 
percentage experiencing earnings decreases rose from 25% in 2007/08 to 50% in 2008/09. 
The figures for 2009/10 and 2010/11 fell slightly, but remained high. In each year of the 
crisis, the median earnings change in the private sector was approximately zero. However, 
this aggregate figure masks the heterogeneity of earnings responses to the crisis in the private 
sector.  
The histograms reported in Figures 3 and 4 for public and private sector workers 
respectively show these earnings dynamics in more detail. Looking at Figure 3, we see 
marked differences in the public sector earnings change distributions before and after the 
crisis. In the pre-crisis period, there is a spike at roughly the inflation rate, coinciding with the 
settlements in the national wage agreements that were in operation in this period; this spike 
disappears during the crisis – during which time the national wage agreements were 
abandoned – and there is a clear shift to the left of the earnings change distribution for public 
sector workers. In addition, a strong spike at zero emerges for public sector workers in 
2010/11. The histograms for private sector workers are, for the most part, in keeping with the 
discussion for all workers; there is a persistent spike at zero that increases dramatically during 
the crisis, combined with a substantial increase in the proportion of workers experiencing 
earnings cuts at the height of the crisis. However, the spike at the inflation rate in the pre-
crisis period is absent in the private sector graphs, which is consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence that private sector employers did not adhere to national wage agreements.  
The very large number of observations in the JC data permits a more detailed 
breakdown of the earnings changes, classifying workers by broad industrial sector. We begin 
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by looking at the incidence of year-on-year earnings cuts, increases and freezes. The results 
are given in Figure 5. As similar patterns were evident in each of the pre-crisis year pairs, we 
only present the graph for 2005/06, which shows that pay rises dominate in every sector; 
approximately 80% of workers in each sector receive earnings increases. The figures for the 
crisis period reveal an increase in the incidence of earnings cuts in all sectors. However, 
sectoral differences are apparent. The impact of the crisis on the Construction sector is 
evident in all three years, while in later years earnings decreases were widespread in Public 
Administration & Education, in Health and in Utilities (gas, electricity and water).  
 The year-on-year earnings changes presented so far do not allow us to examine 
cumulative pay changes for a given individual. For example, it is possible that workers whose 
earnings have been cut in one year have had those pay cuts reversed in subsequent years, 
resulting in small cumulative pay changes over several years. To address this issue, we 
examine median cumulative pay changes separately for the pre-crisis and crisis periods by 
industrial sector. The results are given in Figure 6. Looking at the pre-crisis period we see 
substantial pay growth in 2005-2008 for all workers, with a median of 16.5%. In contrast, the 
median cumulative pay change from 2008-2011 was -2%, indicating that pay cuts were not 
reversed. However, Figure 6 also indicates significant variation across sectors, with pre-crisis 
cumulative increases for job stayers ranging from a median of 13.5% in Construction to 
22.5% in Finance & Insurance. During the crisis, the median pay change was negative in 
most sectors, with Construction being the hardest hit, with a median cumulative earnings 
change of -10%. It is notable that the Finance & Insurance sector, which experienced the 
biggest increase in median pay in the pre-crisis period, has been one of the least affected 
during the crisis. This finding echoes that of Bell and Van Reenan (2014) for the UK. 
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6. Further Analysis using EU-SILC Data 
As noted earlier, changes in annual reckonable income may reflect changes in hours worked, 
in non-core pay or in pension contributions, as well as changes in the rates of pay. To 
examine these issues in more detail, we use the EU-SILC survey data. In this dataset, the 
annual earnings variable excludes non-core pay and includes pension contributions. The data 
also include an hourly wage variable. To minimize measurement error, we consider 
subsamples of workers who consulted their payslips before answering the earnings 
question.
10
 This payslip information is only available from 2006. 
We begin by comparing the dynamics for annual JC and EU-SILC earnings. Table 4 
shows the results from the EU-SILC, alongside the results from the JC reproduced from 
Table 1. Looking first at the median changes, we see that with the exception of 2008/09, both 
datasets give very similar aggregate results. In both datasets, earnings growth falls from about 
6% in 2006/07 to about 4.5% in 2007/08, is negative in 2009/10 and small and positive in 
2010/11. The only difference between the two series arises in 2008/09, where the median rise 
in earnings in the EU-SILC data was 5%, compared to a fall of 0.6% in the JC data. This 
difference is explained by the Public Sector Pension Levy introduced in 2009 discussed 
earlier. The trends in the percentages receiving earnings freezes, cuts or increases are also 
similar across the two datasets. Both datasets show a rise in the percentage receiving earnings 
cuts and a fall in the percentage receiving earnings increases during the crisis. The similarity 
of the two sets of results – apart from the 2009 pension levy – suggests that changes to non-
core pay and discretionary pension contributions were not important determinants of earnings 
dynamics.  
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 We have also looked at the full sample and the key findings are similar. 
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It has been well documented (e.g. Walsh, 2012) that firms in Ireland responded to the 
crisis in part by adjusting hours of work, which would be reflected in changes in annual 
earnings with no corresponding change in hourly pay. Since the EU-SILC provides 
information on hours worked, it allows us to examine dynamics in hourly pay. The results are 
given in Table 5; to allow comparison, we reproduce the EU-SILC results on annual earnings 
from Table 4 in the first five columns. The major features of wage dynamics reported earlier 
for annual earnings using both the JC and EU-SILC data are still evident when we use hourly 
pay. The percentage of workers receiving a cut in hourly pay increases from below 25% in 
2006/07 to about 48% in 2009/10, as the labour market reacted significantly to the crisis. The 
most notable difference between the two series is the fact that in all years, a higher 
percentage of workers report a pay freeze when using hourly pay as opposed to annual pay. 
Furthermore, this difference increases substantially during the crisis period, supporting the 
view that firms responded to the crisis by adjusting hours as well as base pay. Nevertheless, 
the percentage of workers receiving pay freezes when hourly wages are used is still relatively 
low in the years immediately following the onset of the crisis.  
7. Measurement of Wage Rigidity  
So far, we have examined the proportion of freezes and cuts in the wage change distribution 
as indicators of wage flexibility. In this final section of the paper we turn to the construction 
of a measure of wage rigidity, which attempts to identify the proportion of desired cuts that 
are prevented from occurring. Many measures of rigidity have been proposed.
11
 These 
include the ‘skewness location approach’ (McLaughlin, 1994), the ‘histogram location 
approach’ (Kahn, 1997) and the ‘symmetry approach’ (Card and Hyslop, 1997; Montes and 
Ehrlich, 2013). These alternatives identify wage rigidity either through shifts in the location 
                                                          
11
 For a summary of  many of these measures see Beissinger and Knoppik (2001). 
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of wage change histograms, or by assumptions on the form of the counterfactual distribution 
that would be observed in the absence of rigidity. However, all of these measures require that 
the highest wage change affected by rigidity is smaller than the median of the counterfactual 
distribution. The economic crisis in Ireland was so severe that in a number of years the 
median observed pay change was negative, thus violating this requirement.
12
 Furthermore the 
limited variation in the location of the wage change histogram in our data poses a problem for 
location-based approaches. 
Dickens et al. (2007) propose a simple measure of downward nominal wage rigidity 
that is not dependent on wage change medians being positive or on large variation in the 
location of the distribution. This measure is based on the assumption that everyone who had a 
nominal freeze would have had a wage cut in the absence of wage rigidity. The measure is 
defined simply as the ratio of the proportion of workers receiving freezes to the proportion 
receiving either cuts or freezes. This measure provides a consistent measure of wage rigidity 
provided all desired wage cuts that are not enacted are recorded as wage freezes and that 
wage rigidity does not affect firms wishing to offer pay increases. 
In Dickens et al.’s cross country comparison, the average degree of downward rigidity 
is 28%. Their average for Ireland for the period 1993 to 2001 is 4%, the lowest of all 
countries covered, but as noted earlier, they express reservations about the Irish data. We 
calculate this measure using the JC data
13
 and the results are reported in Table 6. Rigidity was 
16%-18% in the pre-crisis period. Although these figures are substantially higher than those 
                                                          
12
 Yet another approach is the earnings function approach (Altonji and Devereux, 2000, Barwell and 
Schweitizer, 2007, Bauer et al., 2007 and Devicienti et al., 2007). This approach relies on parametric 
assumptions for identification.  
13
 When calculating the rigidity measure we take account of the fact that the different numbers of pays days 
across years may result in some freezes being recorded as increases or decreases. In particular we use the 
observed frequency of workers in small bins either side of -1.9% and +1.9% to impute the predicted frequency 
in the affected bin. The difference between the observed and predicted frequencies is added to the pay freezes in 
Table 1when calculating the rigidity measure. 
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reported by Dickens et al. for Ireland, they are still low relative to many of the other countries 
reported in their analysis. Our estimates are similar to their results for the U.K. and only 
slightly higher than those for Denmark, France and Belgium, which are the three most 
flexible countries in their analysis after Ireland. 
At the onset of the crisis, measured downward rigidity fell substantially to 10.1% in 
2008/09 before rising again to 21.3% by 2010/11. The finding that wage rigidity fell with the 
onset of the crisis is consistent with previous work that found that cyclical downturns relax 
nominal wage rigidity (Beissinger and Knoppik, 2001). The predominant explanation for 
downward wage rigidity is that employers avoid reducing wages because of the effect on 
morale. Bewley (1999) examined wage rigidity in the US during the recession of 1991-1992, 
and found that managers used wage cuts only in circumstances where the firm faced serious 
problems. Since the economic crisis in Ireland caused serious problems for many firms, it is 
plausible that downward nominal wage rigidity would be lessened in these years. In addition, 
Gordon (1996), in his comment on Akerlof et al.’s paper on the impact of wage rigidity in a 
low-inflation environment, suggests that nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as 
unfair. The fact that inflation dropped and then turned negative during the crisis might also 
explain the fall in downward nominal wage rigidity.  
However, our findings for the latter part of the crisis suggest that this reduction in 
rigidity may not be permanent. By the end of our sample period, at which time Ireland was 
still experiencing significant economic difficulties, estimated rigidity had returned to its pre-
crisis level. Since the Dickens et al. (2007) measure is identified from the spike at zero in the 
wage change distribution, it is useful to consider the source of the spike in 2010/11 in more 
detail. One possibility is that firms in Ireland found pay cuts difficult to implement after two 
consecutive years of cuts, in which case the increased spike comes from the left-hand side of 
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the wage change distribution. An alternative possibility is that the proportion of freezes is 
rising because firms who would otherwise give pay rises are reluctant to do so because wage 
rigidity would prevent reversals of these rises in subsequent years (Elsby, 2009). In this case, 
the increased spike comes from the right-hand side of the distribution. We use the 
distributions of earnings changes for 2008/09 and 2010/11, shown in Figure 7, to assess these 
explanations. Comparing the two distributions, it is apparent that the right side of the 
distribution is similar in both years and that the increase in rigidity in 2010/11 is being drawn 
largely from the left side of the distribution, with some counterfactual wage cuts being swept 
up to zero. There is little evidence that the increased spike in the last year of our analysis is 
been driven by postponed pay rises as opposed to postponed pay cuts. 
 
8. Conclusions 
A large body of macroeconomic research emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting 
for unemployment. However, attempts to measure wage flexibility have been hindered by 
small samples and measurement error in earnings data. In this paper we examine nominal 
wage flexibility in Ireland before and since the start of the Great Recession. Our primary 
analysis uses tax return data that are free from reporting errors and cover the entire 
population of workers. We supplement the analysis of these administrative data with an 
analysis of survey data that allow us to examine earnings dynamics in more detail 
We find a significant degree of downward flexibility in both annual earnings and 
hourly wages in the pre-crisis period. We also observe a marked change in wage dynamics; 
the proportion of workers receiving earnings cuts more than trebled so that at the height of 
the crisis, over half of all workers were experiencing earnings decreases. In addition, we find 
that measured wage rigidity was low initially and fell substantially at the onset of the crisis. 
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Although results based on wage changes at the aggregate level suggest that wages did 
not respond to the crisis in Ireland, our results highlight the potential deficiencies of using 
aggregate data to assess the behaviour of labour markets over the business cycle. Focusing on 
individual wage changes, we show that wages responded dramatically to changing economic 
conditions. This suggests that downward wage rigidity has not been a key driver of high 
unemployment in Ireland.  
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Table 1: Annual Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data, All Job Stayers 
 
Year 
Median 
Change  
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
2005/2006 0.060 2.5 17.2 80.4 
2006/2007 0.061 2.5 17.6 79.9 
2007/2008 0.045 2.8 22.9 74.2 
2008/2009 -0.006 3.3 52.7 44.0 
2009/2010 -0.011 4.4 55.2 40.3 
2010/2011 0.006 6.8 39.3 53.9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sizes of Pay Cuts (Rises) for those Receiving Cuts (Rises) 
Year Median Cut Median Rise 
2005/2006 -0.050 0.078 
2006/2007 -0.051 0.079 
2007/2008 -0.053 0.066 
2008/2009 -0.060 0.046 
2009/2010 -0.060 0.051 
2010/2011 -0.037 0.044 
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Table 3: Annual Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data, Job Stayers, Public and Private Sectors  
 
 
Year 
All Public Sector Private Sector 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
2005/
2006 
0.060 2.5 17.2 80.4 0.063 0.6 14.8 84.6 0.058 3.4 18.3 78.2 
2006/
2007 
0.061 2.5 17.6 79.9 0.067 0.6 13.6 85.8 0.058 3.4 18.9 77.7 
2007/
2008 
0.045 2.8 22.9 74.2 0.050 0.7 18.5 80.8 0.042 3.9 24.9 71.3 
2008/
2009 
-0.006 3.3 52.7 44.0 -0.015 1.4 59.3 39.3 -0.002 4.3 50.4 45.3 
2009/
2010 
-0.011 4.4 55.2 40.3 -0.060 1.2 81.0 17.8 0 5.7 46.4 47.9 
2010/
2011 
0.006 6.8 39.3 53.9 0.010 4.8 36.4 58.8 0.004 7.8 39.9 52.2 
 
 
 
Table 4: Annual Earnings Dynamics, EU-SILC and Job Churn Data, All Job Stayers 
 
 
 
Year 
Nominal Annual Earnings EU-SILC 
(Payslips available) 
Nominal Annual Earnings Job Churn 
(Taken from Table 1) 
 
N 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
2006-
2007 
326 0.060 2.8 22.1 75.2 0.061 2.5 17.6 79.9 
2007-
2008 
757 0.044 1.7 28.0 70.3 0.045 2.8 22.9 74.2 
2008-
2009 
638 0.047 0.6 35.9 63.5 -0.006 3.3 52.7 44.0 
2009-
2010 
604 -0.018 0.5 55.8 43.7 -0.011 4.4 55.2 40.3 
2010-
2011 
412 0.010 3.9 40.6 56.1 0.006 6.8 39.3 53.9 
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Table 5: Annual Earnings and Hourly Wage Dynamics, EU-SILC, All Job Stayers with 
Pay Slips Available 
 
 
 
Year 
Nominal Annual Earnings 
(Taken from Table 4) 
Nominal Hourly Wages 
 
N 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
N Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Rises 
2006-
2007 
326 0.060 2.8 22.1 75.2 326 0.054 3.7 24.8 71.5 
2007-
2008 
757 0.044 1.7 28.0 70.3 757 0.049 3.4 27.1 69.5 
2008-
2009 
638 0.047 0.6 35.9 63.5 638 0.027 6.7 32.9 60.3 
2009-
2010 
604 -0.018 0.5 55.8 43.7 604 0 9.6 49.0 41.4 
2010-
2011 
412 0.010 3.9 40.6 56.1 412 0 13.8 40.5 45.6 
 
Table 6: Time Pattern of Wage Rigidity  
 % of Wage Cuts 
Prevented by Rigidity 
2005/06 18.1 
2006/07 17.3 
2007/08 16.4 
2008/09 10.1 
2009/10 12.1 
2010/11 21.3 
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Figure 1: Average Job Stayers’ Real Annual Earnings and Unemployment Rate      
2006-2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
u
n
e
m
p
_
ra
te
3
8
0
3
9
0
4
0
0
4
1
0
4
2
0
re
a
l_
e
a
rn
in
g
s
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
year
real_earnings unemp_rate
28 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data, All Job Stayers 
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Figure 3: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data, Public Sector Job Stayers 
 
 
Figure 4: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data, Private Sector Job Stayers 
 
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2005 to 2006, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2006 to 2007, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2007 to 2008, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2008 to 2009, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2009 to 2010, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4-.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2010 to 2011, Public Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
2005 to 2006, Private Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
2006 to 2007, Private Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
2007 to 2008, Private Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2008 to 2009, Private Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2009 to 2010, Private Sector
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
P
e
rc
e
n
t
-.5 -.4 -.3 -.2-.1 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Proportionate Change in Annual Pay
2010 to 2011, Private Sector
30 
 
Figure 5: Incidence of Pay Changes by NACE Sector 
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Figure 6: Cumulative Pay Changes 2005-2008 and 2008-2011 by NACE Sector 
 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Nominal Wage Changes 2008-2009 and 2010-2011 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Proportion of Workers who are Job Stayers by Sector and Year 
NACE Sector 2005/
06 
2006/
07 
2007/
08 
 
2008/
09 
2009/
10 
2010/
11 
Agriculture/Mining 0.351 0.347 0.347 0.304 0.338 0.363 
Manufacturing 0.449 0.434 0.446 0.421 0.479 0.507 
Utilities 0.602 0.592 0.563 0.572 0.603 0.596 
Construction 0.192 0.177 0.157 0.138 0.153 0.174 
Wholesale/Retail   0.289 0.295 0.304 0.322 0.409 0.410 
Transport/Storage 0.468 0.423 0.445 0.455 0.483 0.507 
Accommodation/Food 0.144 0.135 0.141 0.164 0.191 0.195 
Information/Communication 0.442 0.439 0.445 0.457 0.500 0.491 
Finance/Insurance 0.518 0.484 0.560 0.614 0.647 0.561 
Real Estate 0.336 0.309 0.298 0.296 0.337 0.373 
Professional/Scientific 0.386 0.374 0.369 0.363 0.399 0.385 
Admin/Support 0.171 0.161 0.152 0.183 0.222 0.244 
Public Admin and 
Education 
0.651 0.664 0.665 0.652 0.493 0.625 
Health 0.465 0.477 0.503 0.518 0.547 0.528 
Arts/Recreation 0.259 0.257 0.261 0.284 0.314 0.314 
Other Services 0.330 0.304 0.308 0.314 0.344 0.342 
All 0.360 0.358 0.365 0.377 0.408 0.434 
 
